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10   november

Democratic Crisis in Latin America – Interview with Donato Di Santo

Latin America is undergoing a period of profound political transformation, marked by the rise of the far-right, growing polarization, and new forms of democratic erosion. These processes are not developing in isolation, but are part of a broader transnational reconfiguration of conservative and authoritarian forces.

In his latest book, L’internazionale reazionaria. Dall’America Latina all’Europa le reti della nuova destra (“The Reactionary International: From Latin America to Europe, the Networks of the New Right”) (2026), Donato Di Santo analyzes the connections between these political forces and their implications for the future of democracy.

For RESIST, we discussed with him the roots of the rise of the radical right in Latin America, the risks of democratic regression, and, above all, the role that civil society can play in countering authoritarian tendencies and building new forms of democratic resilience.

1. The Rise of the Radical Right and the Roots of the Democratic Crisis

In recent years, we have witnessed a significant advance of the radical right in Latin America, from Milei in Argentina and Bukele in El Salvador to Bolsonarismo in Brazil. In your view, what are the main political, economic, and social conditions explaining this phenomenon? Is it primarily a reaction to the crisis of Latin American democracies, or does it represent a more structured political project aimed at transforming democratic institutions?

Donato di Santo: The gestation of this conservative revolution has been underway for decades, since the Reagan-Thatcher era. In my book, I use the term permeability to describe the channels of communication and interaction between certain traditional right-wing forces and the new far right. There are some emblematic examples: in Spain, Aznar’s People’s Party (PP) and Vox; in Italy, Berlusconism and the racist Lega, alongside post-fascist nationalism; in the United States, the Republicans and MAGA sovereigntism and Trumpism; in Peru, Vargas Llosa and Keiko Fujimori; in Argentina, Macrism and Milei; and in Chile, RN and UDI and Kast’s neo-Pinochetism.

Their ideological arsenal also draws on the instrumental manipulation of Gramsci’s thought. This trajectory stretches from the two documents produced by the Santa Fe Group, which laid the foundations for the strategy of “low-intensity warfare”, through Evola and, above all, de Benoist and his GRECE movement, to the River Plate region’s turbo-Milei ideologues, such as Laje, Marquez, and Kaiser.

The 2008 global financial crisis certainly played a role, although its impact was less devastating and, in any case, delayed compared with other regions. In Latin America, particularly South America, the period of economic prosperity and relative expansion driven by the commodity export boom, especially exports to China, lasted for several years. China subsequently established a strong presence throughout the region, becoming the leading trading partner of virtually every country, with Colombia as the exception.

Latin America’s middle classes, being more limited in size because of the region’s pronounced inequality and starting from a much lower economic position than their European counterparts, were less severely affected. Meanwhile, the rural and urban sub-proletariat benefited, until the end of the first decade of this century, from policies aimed at reducing poverty and extreme poverty in Brazil, but also in Mexico, Chile, and elsewhere. These groups certainly did not become middle class, but they made enormous strides towards acquiring full citizenship.

These considerations, for which I apologise for their necessarily brief treatment, underpin my conviction that the emergence of the new radical right and new far-right movements in Latin America (or the “far right 2.0”, to use Forti’s expression) can be attributed primarily to other factors. These include the severity of public security problems (as Bukele demonstrates); the instrumental exploitation of religious sentiment; the veritable invasion, financed by extensive US-based lobbying networks, of evangelical and neo-Pentecostal movements, which played a decisive role, for example, in the election of Bolsonaro Sr. in 2018; the anti-establishment illusion fostered by populists who are themselves part of the establishment; historical revisionism in a South American guise, with the brazen rehabilitation of military dictatorships; and the promotion of militarism disguised as cheap identity-based nationalism, subservient to MAGA and ready to sell off national flags, dignity, and rare earth resources at the altar of Trump’s “Shield” and “Corollary”.

Other factors include the reckless, thuggish use of social media; the spread of so-called pro-life and family movements, which turn rights into concessions and seek to roll back women’s autonomy and self-determination; and, last but not least, the attacks on LGBT movements and the rights and living conditions of Indigenous peoples.

Compared with Europe, the instrumental exploitation of migration issues, anti-globalism, and anti-multilateralism play a less central role.

I certainly do not deny that we are witnessing a crisis of democracy in Latin America as well, although perhaps to a lesser extent than in our own countries. People still go to the polls! They may end up electing Kast, Keiko, or De la Espriella… but they also elect Lula! And, in any case, institutional structures continue to hold.

Let me give just one example: Brazil. Despite countless delays and shortcomings, Brazilian institutions withstood Bolsonaro Sr.’s attempted coup in 2023. Those who masterminded and participated in the invasion of the Planalto Palace, starting with the former president and his military ministers, were duly tried, convicted, and are serving their sentences. As Ricupero reminds us, the same cannot be said of those who stormed Capitol Hill, who were pardoned and remain at liberty.

2. A Reactionary International: What Links Latin America, the United States, and Europe?

In your latest book, The Reactionary International, you map the networks connecting the new Latin American right with Trumpism and Europe’s radical right. How deep are these connections, and through which political, cultural, economic, and communication channels do these movements reinforce one another? Can we speak of a transnational strategy to erode democracy?

Donato di Santo: These connections are indeed deep, structured, and networked. Rather than using the term “international”, which has the advantage of immediately conveying what we are talking about but also risks suggesting a monolithic, hierarchical organisation with a vertical structure, perhaps we should call it a “network”.

This international reactionary network embodies a paradox. Anti-globalists, anti-multilateralists, sovereigntists and, in a nutshell, nationalists have created a network, a system, an international structure. They have become internationalists.

Meanwhile, the internationalists – those who believed in the slogan “Workers of all countries, unite!”, those who stood in solidarity with liberation movements, from the Spanish Republic to the Vietnamese people’s struggle, from the Cuban Revolution (the anti-Batista revolution, not the subsequent suffocating nepotistic Castroist regime) to Salvador Allende’s Chilean road to socialism and the Sandinista Revolution (which has absolutely nothing in common with today’s two-headed reactionary dictatorship) – have retreated within their national borders!

They have abandoned internationalism, leaving the field open to the new nationalist far right.

And the latter have seized that international space!

Being as shrewd as they are, they have first and foremost swept under the carpet the formidable contradictions inherent in their own movements.

In Italy, Prime Minister Meloni conceals and downplays the enormous contradiction of governing in coalition with a party – Salvini’s Lega – that not only supported the Russian nationalist and xenophobe Zhirinovsky but has also, more recently, signed a cooperation agreement with United Russia, Putin’s puppet party. She also minimises and glosses over the antisemitism present among sections of her own party’s grassroots, as exposed by the commendable investigative reporting of Fanpage.

Swept under the same carpet are the heated disputes between Argentine and Chilean military circles over the highly sensitive issue of the Strait of Magellan, even as their respective presidents, the self-proclaimed anarcho-capitalist Milei and the neo-Pinochetist Kast, publicly display an artificial harmony.

The same carpet also conceals the contradiction surrounding Colombia’s newly elected president, Abelardo De la Espriella (ADLE). Until the eve of the election campaign, he was a defence lawyer for paramilitaries such as Salvatore Mancuso, drug traffickers, and, in particular, Alex Saab, the powerful financial intermediary of Venezuelan autocrat Maduro. Some analysts suggest that his involvement went beyond legal representation. He now presents himself as a champion of law and order, courting the military.

Above all, however, this carpet conceals the glaring contradictions in the relationship between the populist nationalisms of many of Latin America’s new reactionary presidents and the neo-imperialism of the Trumpian mafia, which, through its global division of spheres of influence, seeks to impose feudal control over the so-called Western Hemisphere.

This last, hemispheric contradiction points to another, transatlantic – or, more accurately, Ibero-American – contradiction: the impasse into which Vox’s political platform has fallen following the adoption of the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy (December 2025), National Defense Strategy (January 2026), and Shield of the Americas (March 2026).

Unlike his Italian, German, French, and Austrian counterparts, Vox leader Santiago Abascal does not focus primarily on the issue of mass forced deportation, better known by the term “remigration”, which sounds more like an advertisement for a travel agency. His flagship cause is explicitly neo-colonial: the Reconquista of Spanish America!

This strategy underpins the “Madrid Charter”, a programmatic document enthusiastically – and absurdly! – signed by Meloni as well, and promoted through the “Madrid Forum” meetings organised by the Disenso Foundation.

Well, with the advent of the Trump-Rubio Corollary and MAGA neo-imperialism in the so-called Western Hemisphere, Abascal’s project of reconquest risks falling to pieces.

So much for some examples of internal contradictions. But you also ask about the networks linking the new right-wing movements and their role in eroding democracy. Indeed, these networks exist! I discuss them in considerable detail in my book. For the sake of brevity, I will mention just a few.

The first is the close and disturbing relationship that has developed with the Israeli far right. Almost all the extremist Latin American presidents enjoy privileged relations with Netanyahu. They have visited Tel Aviv to “kiss the ring” – and, in some cases, also to acquire sophisticated anti-democratic surveillance systems such as Pegasus. They often seal their ideological allegiance by relocating their countries’ embassies from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.

I have already mentioned the network surrounding the Madrid Forum.

Another crucial hub is CPAC, the Conservative Political Action Conferences. These traditional conservative gatherings have been repurposed and made available to the new far-right extremists. Meloni is a regular presence, both attending events in the United States in person and sending delegations from her party to those held in Latin America.

Furthermore, following Orbán’s electoral defeat in Hungary – he had been CPAC’s principal representative in Europe – Meloni has tasked her political associate Giubilei with meeting Matthew Schlapp, the head of this organisation, to put herself forward as Orbán’s replacement and host the 2027 European CPAC in Rome.

3. Democratic Backsliding: How Can We Recognise the Warning Signs of Authoritarianism?

The Latin American experience shows how democracy can be weakened not only through outright authoritarian ruptures, but also gradually, by elected leaders who concentrate power, delegitimise opposition forces, and undermine institutional checks and balances. What do you consider the most worrying developments in the current Latin American context? And what lessons can this region offer European democracies?

Donato di Santo: That is true. Beyond authoritarian ruptures, such as coups, democracy is also endangered by the corrosive actions of individuals who, despite having been formally elected, instrumentalise their positions and power to dismantle institutions, overturn the balance of powers, and illegitimately perpetuate themselves in office.

Bolsonaro first attempted this with the complicity of the judge-sheriff Sergio Moro, who – also with the help of advice from Piercamillo Davigo, a former member of Italy’s Mani Pulite (“Clean Hands”) investigative team – unlawfully imprisoned Lula, paving the way for Bolsonaro’s electoral victory. Moro was rewarded with a ministerial position in Bolsonaro’s ultra-militarist government.

Bolsonaro tried again by fomenting the violent coup attempt against Lula in 2023. That attempt failed.

Bukele, more astute and efficient, has used the presidency to dismantle the system of checks and balances, undermine the legislative branch, extend the number of presidential terms available to himself, and build a system of clientelist power centred on his own family. He has supported all these attacks on El Salvador’s already fragile democratic system through the massive authoritarian exploitation of an objectively very serious problem: citizens’ security, threatened by the widespread and oppressive violence of criminal youth gangs (maras and pandillas).

The construction of mega-prisons and concentration-camp-like facilities, which have become the backdrop for the horrifying selfies taken by North and South American autocrats visiting El Salvador, has turned into his appalling political calling card.

In Paraguay, Peña has relied on the efficient propaganda machine of the Partido Colorado, the party of former dictator Stroessner, the longest-ruling political party in Latin America. He has also relied on the business-oriented version of this machine, embodied by his predecessor and the country’s real power broker, Cartes.

In Honduras, Trump’s intervention was direct: both to secure the election of his preferred candidate and to bring the former president, a convicted drug trafficker, Hernández, back to his country after granting him a pardon.

Other examples could be added, including Ecuador, Argentina, Peru, Costa Rica, Panama, and Bolivia.

However, I would be biased if I failed to include among the authoritarian ruptures and assaults on democracy those countries which, despite emerging from progressive or left-wing political experiences, have repudiated their original foundations and become breeding grounds for state authoritarianism: Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela.

I cannot take up too much of the space available here, but I discuss these issues extensively in my book.

Some Latin American left-wing forces have failed to fully reckon with the central importance of democracy. Democracy must be the foundation of social change. Without a full commitment to democratic values and rules – and, indeed, without their vigorous defence – the foundations for lasting social transformation are also undermined.

In some cases, however, the relationship between winning government office and seizing power became blurred. Certain lines were crossed. This is one of the fundamental issues that must be addressed if we are to understand not only that political period but also what followed.

4. Civil Society as a Bulwark Against Democratic Backsliding

In the face of the advance of the radical right and the gradual erosion of democratic institutions, what role can social movements, trade unions, feminist organisations, Indigenous communities, and human rights associations play? Are there any particularly effective examples of mobilisation and democratic resistance in Latin America that you believe could also serve as models beyond the region?

Donato di Santo: This is an interesting and complex question that deserves extensive and in-depth discussion. Rather than monopolising the space available to me, I will simply highlight one extraordinary case study and source of political learning: Lula’s remarkable electoral comeback between the first and second rounds of Brazil’s presidential election.

This was an extraordinary phenomenon. Alongside Lula’s exceptional political skills and his ability to turn his opponents’ own weapons against them – including the extensive use of social media – it was driven by the intelligent mobilisation of trade union organisations, feminist and youth movements, LGBT movements, and Indigenous peoples’ organisations.

5. From Resistance to Democratic Reconstruction: What Are the Antidotes?

Resisting authoritarian tendencies is essential, but it may not be enough unless we also address the inequalities, distrust in institutions, and sense of exclusion that fuel support for the radical right. What strategies should democratic forces and civil society adopt to build a credible alternative? And how important would it be to develop transnational networks of democratic solidarity capable of countering what you call the “reactionary international”?

Donato di Santo: I agree. Unless we address the structural foundations of intolerable social inequalities – particularly abhorrent in Latin America – we will not succeed in building credible alternatives. The recent international meeting of progressive forces in Barcelona, promoted by Lula and Sánchez and attended by government leaders such as Mexican President Sheinbaum and Uruguayan President Orsi, as well as political figures such as Italy’s Elly Schlein, has certainly outlined a possible path forward. This initiative should be pursued and strengthened, expanding beyond the political sphere to encompass social movements, trade unions, and the defence of rights.


Donato Di Santo is an Italian expert on Latin America and international relations, with a long-standing career dedicated to strengthening political, diplomatic and cultural ties between Italy and the Latin American region. He served as Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs, with responsibility for Latin America, in the second Prodi government (2006–2008), coordinated the Italy–Latin America and Caribbean Conferences, and was Secretary-General of the Italo-Latin American International Organization (IILA) from 2017 to 2019. He is the author of several publications on Latin American politics and international relations, including Italia e America Latina. Storia di una idea di politica estera (2021), and continues to contribute to research and debate on relations between the two regions.