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2   november

Italy as a Hub for Far-Right (and Resistance to It)

By Batuhan Eren |

Italy is living through one of its most contentious autumns in years. In mid-October, thousands of high school students marched in dozens of cities against crumbling classrooms, and their mobilisation quickly merged with wider anger over unaffordable housing, stagnant wages and the rising cost of living. On 17 October, a march in Milan that began peacefully ended in clashes around Piazza del Duomo, with tear gas, water cannons and dozens of young people detained, many of them minors. The government’s answer came three days later: a new security decree that creates a specific offence for group violence at demonstrations, presumes criminal capacity for teenagers from the age of fourteen, and sends 500 additional soldiers onto the streets of Milan.

The government’s response has reignited debate about the state of democracy in Italy. Just as the diffusion of these France-originated protests to European countries such as Spain, Belgium, Italy and Portugal, illiberal, authoritarian and far-right politics have also been spreading across Europe in recent years: the V-Dem Institute’s 2026 Democracy Report finds seven EU member states autocratising, with Italy among the newcomers to the list. Far-right parties and organisations that once sat on the margins now govern or set the agenda across much of Europe, and they increasingly learn from one another, build alliances and collaborate across borders. In a recent article with Manuela Caiani, we explored this transnational side of the far-right’s rise, and how Italy has become one of its “hubs”: a place that connects political and social actors and brings them together to cooperate.

More than a far-right government: A hub

It is tempting to explain Italy’s place on the European far-right map with a single name, Giorgia Meloni. Her trajectory, from leading a party with 2% of the vote in 2013 to becoming a prime minister with whom both Brussels and Washington do business, has made her a model for far-right actors elsewhere. Her foreign policy, highly personalised and built on direct diplomacy, has given her international visibility: she was the only EU leader invited to Donald Trump’s inauguration in 2025, she positions herself as a mediator between the mainstream conservatives of the European Parliament and Viktor Orbán’s Hungary, and her Albania agreement turned the externalisation of asylum into a European talking point.

However, a “hub” requires more than a well-connected government or a leader. It is a political setting whose actors connect groups that would otherwise be only loosely linked, channelling ideas, tactics and resources across borders. Italy combines three ingredients that make this possible. The first is a long legacy, going back to Mussolini’s attempts to build a “Fascist International” in the 1930s and to the post-war Movimento Sociale Italiano’s ties with neo-fascists abroad. The second is a dense and diverse far-right milieu, ranging from governing parties such as Fratelli d’Italia and the Lega to movement-parties such as Forza Nuova and anti-gender organisations such as Pro Vita & Famiglia. The third is a government whose domestic and foreign policy work as one. Meloni is at once a participant in the far-right’s transnational gatherings, such as the US Conservative Political Action Conference, and a head of government whose diplomacy, research shows, cares less than other Italian governments have about the democratic credentials of the countries she visits, lending legitimacy to authoritarian leaders. What she does at home and what she does abroad reinforce each other, and the wider far-right seems to draw on both.

Italian actors are not simply guests at these international gatherings; they often organise them and hold the networks together. Pro Vita & Famiglia, one of the best-connected organisations in the European far-right digital sphere, sits at the centre of a dense web of pro-life and pro-family groups across the continent and helped bring the 2019 World Congress of Families to Verona, where parties, Catholic associations and anti-gender movements from Italy and abroad met. Associazione Family Day works through a federation of pro-life associations from several European countries that lobbies the EU and the Council of Europe. The Lega, a prominent member of the Identity and Democracy and Patriots for Europe groups in the European Parliament, hosted its “Winds of Change” meeting in Rome in 2024 for its European allies, while Fratelli d’Italia and its youth wing have appeared on stages from Vox’s VIVA 21 in Madrid to the 2022 “Fortezza Europa” meeting in Verona. Further to the margins, Forza Nuova has drawn foreign activists to anti-abortion rallies in Verona, anti-immigrant marches in Rimini and anti-lockdown protests in Rome, and has become a reference point for far-right groups as far away as Brazil. From these events to the 2025 “Remigration Summit” in Milan, Italy has repeatedly offered the stage on which far-right Europe gathers, above all around gender, family and religion.

The hub does not, however, work in the same way for everyone. While the Meloni government may open room for cooperation, it also intensifies competition at home: some extra-parliamentary actors told us they felt cast as the “dark side of government”, left with a “scarcity of resources, less than ever before”. For them, transnationalisation is a strategic move, a way to gain legitimacy and reputation while learning from allies abroad.

Considering this hub feature of current Italy, what happens inside Italy matters precisely for other European countries. Successive security decrees that criminalise forms of peaceful protest and widen police powers, offshore asylum centres in Albania, and a law making surrogacy a “universal crime” even when Italians use it abroad are domestic policies, but they are also showcases. Coming from a government celebrated abroad as proof that the far-right can govern “responsibly”, they become models for others: a hub circulates not only frames on migration, gender or “civilisation”, but also ways of governing dissent. Normalisation at home and projection abroad feed each other.

Towards transnational democratic solidarity

Under these conditions, it would be misleading to look at the protests in Italy in isolation, or to see the wave of protests spreading across Europe as being only about failing public services or the rising cost of living. These movements are taking place in a broader context of growing illiberal and far-right politics, which are themselves increasingly organised across national borders. Seeing these protests as separate disputes between citizens and their governments means overlooking the wider political forces they are up against.

This is why solidarity across borders matters. It already exists in the slogans, tactics and images that travel from one square to another, and in the networks of students, trade unions and activists who follow and support one another’s struggles. But as far-right movements become increasingly connected across Europe, democratic and social movements need to invest more in these existing networks of solidarity. The challenge is to turn scattered protests over schools, housing and wages into lasting cross-border networks that share strategies to resist the criminalisation of dissent, just as their opponents share strategies to consolidate their power. The pro-Palestinian student movement and transnational feminist networks offer particularly valuable lessons recently in how to build and sustain solidarity across borders, coordinate collective action and connect struggles rooted in different national contexts. Defending democracy and social rights in Europe may depend on building “hubs” of its own: spaces where activists and politicians from different countries can meet, learn from one another and recognise that they are fighting for a common cause.